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Abstract: In many industries, partners are interconnected in project alliances that have limited
lifespans and clearly-defined boundaries. The transparency of the movie industry provides a unique
opportunity to study how alliance network topologies impact the performance of project alliances
from the perspectives of social networks and organization theories. In this work, we compiled a
massive movie dataset and constructed alliance networks for both movie production and distribution
companies. Using the box office as the proxy for the financial performance of a movie project alliance,
this research investigates how the two alliance networks impact the box office. We introduce the
social network properties of degrees, centralities, and structural holes as alliance network variables
into empirical regression models. The results show that alliance networks have a significant influence
on the box office. The degrees of production companies and the structural holes of distribution
companies are especially important to achieve success in the box office. The results add new evidence
for the study of the movie economy and alliance networks. Meanwhile, this work also provides
implications for the movie industry by revealing that it is essential to wisely choose partners that are
appropriately embedded in alliance networks for the success of a movie project.
Keywords: social network analysis; sociophysics; movie project; box office; alliance network;
centrality; structural holes
1. Introduction
Alliances formed by strategically-collaborating partners are common in a wide range of
industries. These interorganizational systems have attracted studies from the perspective of economics,
organizational science, and strategy management [1,2]. The previous literature investigated various
types of alliance relationships like technology innovation, production development, supply chains,
and joint ventures. By forming an alliance, partners can pool resources, exchange knowledge,
share risks, enhance innovation capabilities, and expand markets [1]. For a focal firm,
alliances established with multiple partners become an alliance portfolio for specific strategic
objectives [3].
Most of these alliances are long-term, continuous, multipurpose, and strategical.
However, some other alliances are formed for a specific purpose or a result orientated toward a
limited lifespan. For instance, a construction project normally involves several partner companies
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to finish [4]. Large-scale software projects are usually developed by multiple developers and
integrators [5]. These temporal and single-purpose cooperations are generalized as project alliances [6].
Typically, once a project goes through all stages, when final commercial values are realized,
project alliances cease to exist and are disbanded to form new alliances for new projects [6].
Though project alliances exist in many domains, there is still a lack of studies on project alliances
compared to the majority of the literature focusing on long-term alliances. In this project alliance
study, the relationships of project performance, partner experience, and project entrepreneurship are
investigated [6,7]. From the perspective of social network theory, partners form a network through
cooperation activities involved in project alliances. Each time, new edges from a set of partners are
added into the network when they establish a project alliance. For a given alliance, partners are
connected and occupying certain positions in the network, laying the foundations for the appliance.
The topological positions occupied by the partners on the network and the implicit social capital and
structural holes obtained by them through the network are expected to affect the performance of the
project alliance in a similar way to the common alliance networks [5,7–11].
There is much research on alliances in different industries, including construction [4], software [5],
research and development [7], biotechnology [9,12], healthcare [10], and enterprises [11]. For the
creative industry, movies and music recordings are the results of joint efforts of multiple partners in
contract-based cooperations. Movies are especially typical projects involving the teamwork of a large
number of individuals and companies working closely in roughly the same standard procedure [13].
Thanks to the public availability of detailed information about the alliances in the movie project
lifetime, it provides a unique opportunity for researchers to look into the mechanisms of project
alliances [14]. In the movie industry, production companies form a production alliance to co-finance
and organize scripting, casting, filming, and post-production through the whole production procedure
of a movie project. Once production is completed, multiple distribution companies form a distribution
alliance to distribute the movie through theaters and other channels. Due to the limited lifespan
of a movie project, the production alliance and the distribution alliance only exist as a temporary
organization. However, a production alliance network between all production companies is formed
through constantly emerging movie-centered production project alliances. A similar case applies for
distribution alliances.
Undoubtedly, art achievements and word of mouth are essential for a movie as a performance
art. However, as an industrial product of an alliance, the financial success or failure of a movie project
concerns all participants. In line with the previous movie economy literature [15–23], we focused on
the financial performance of a movie using the box office as the proxy of the performance of the movie
project alliance. Even though the total revenue for a movie includes the box office and sales generated
through a variety of channels like TVs, DVDs, and online websites, revenues from these sources tend
to be highly correlated with the box office [24]. Moreover, publicly available box office data allow
large-scale empirical studies. These suggest that focusing on the box office is sufficient and feasible.
Movie projects are the joint efforts of production companies and distribution companies interconnected
as alliance networks. The topological properties of alliance networks have a major influence on the
performance of alliances. For a given movie, its production and distribution companies are located in
production alliance networks and distribution alliance networks, respectively. Understanding how the
embeddedness of companies influences financial performance is necessary for movie professionals.
The movie business has grown into a tremendous global industry with huge economic impact [13].
Recent years have witnessed a fast increase in budgets, intensified competitions, and unpredictable
market uncertainties. All these factors turn the making of a movie into a highly risky project.
The production alliance and distribution alliance pool resources by sharing risks, co-financing,
assembling talents, and accessing distribution channels. It is essential to understand how these
common practices in the form of alliances impact the performance of a movie project measured by the
box office. There is sufficient literature on the determinants of movie success, such as sequel, genre,
director, stars, screenplays, culture, and cast [16,18,25]. These characteristics are the most studied and
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widely considered as variables in studies. By introducing social network theory into the study of
the economics of movies, the individual-level social networks of the cast are studied in the aspects
of team composition, producer centrality, producer structural holes, old ties, and coreness [6,26].
In contrast, organizational-level alliance networks formed by production and distribution companies
are less explored.
We used a set of collected movie industry data of 903 movies with the information of
basic movie profiles, box office revenues, as well as their production companies and distribution
companies. Alliance networks were constructed for production and distribution, respectively.
The topological properties of the production alliance and distribution alliance, including degrees,
eigenvector centralities, betweenness centralities, and structural holes, were investigated by
establishing an empirical regression model.
The results showed that topological properties have different contribution levels to the box office.
The degrees of production companies and the structural holes of distribution companies were found
to contribute significantly and positively to the box office, while other properties were found to either
negatively or not significantly contribute to the box office. This work contributes to the literature of
the movie economy, project alliance networks, and alliance performance evaluations with implications
for movie industry professionals. Moreover, the present work provides a new perspective to study
the performance of project alliances by including the network properties of participants involved in
project alliances as alliance network variables in regression models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the movie project alliance is described
with a focus on production alliance and distribution alliance. Section 3 develops the formal hypotheses.
In Section 4, the data are described and summarized. Section 5 discusses the variables and empirical
models. Section 6 reports the model results with a discussion. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the
findings, contributions, practical implications, and the outlook of future research.
2. Movie Project Alliance
The modern movie industry has developed into a considerable global economy, creating millions
of jobs and generating tremendous revenues annually. The uniformity of movie making and the
openness of financial information provide unique opportunities for researchers of organization science,
finance, economics, and strategy management to understand the movie industry [13]. A movie is
a typical project-based business involving multiple stages and different stakeholders. As a joint
project, the success of a movie requires the collaboration of a large number of individual talents,
including directors, screenwriters, and stars, as well as a group of companies to organize and
execute the movie project. Movie projects are becoming more complicated, consuming huge financial
investments and time; all predictable and unpredictable factors contribute to the high risks and
uncertainties. One thread of the literature focuses on the performance of a movie project, which is
normally proxied by box office revenue [27–31]. In this line of research, the factors of the fundamental
movie profile are considered, such as sequels [18,25], stars [17,32–34], genres [35], critics [15,19],
awards [20,36], culture [20,37], seasonality [38], and word of mouth [16,22,39,40]. These empirical
analyses reveal that fundamental profile factors have various degrees of impact on the success and
performance of a movie. These studies also provide rich implications on marketing, cultural economics,
consumer experience, and creative product design [13,41].
With the emergence of social network science [42,43], in recent years, we have witnessed a
thread of studies on individual-level networks in the movie industry. Actors, directors, screenwriters,
and other talents are modeled as social networks through cast and crew collaborations. The actors’
networks and their network properties were investigated [44,45]. However, their impact on movie
profitability is less explored, even though networks carry important information to predict movie
success [28].
The making of a movie not only relies on creative talents, but also depends on the contractual
organizations of companies. Extended on profile factors, there is a thread of the literature that
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explored the factors of movie project alliances at the corporation level. The success of a movie is a
long journey in which production and distribution are the primary two stages requiring substantial
investment, complex organizations, and institutional arrangements [41]. In the production stage,
investments and personnel are organized to finish movie making under the management of one or
several production companies. These production companies form a movie project alliance to share
resources, financial investments, and risks. In this production stage, the issues of risk reduction,
co-financing, and market competition are investigated for production alliances [14]. Co-financing is
to make movies with a large budget, and a production alliance can help to optimize release
dates [14,46]. When a movie is finished, it faces challenges in the distribution stage, such as releasing,
marketing, seasonality, and exhibitor channels [13,47,48]. This distribution process is highly costly,
and carefully-organized resources are required to ensure maximized success in terms of box office
revenues and social influence. All theater box offices are expected to be generated in a concise
show-time window in competition with their competitors. Choosing capable distribution companies
is key in this stage. Sometimes, the production company is also the distribution company of the
same movie. However, it is common that distribution companies are formed as a distribution alliance
for a movie to achieve box office success. These distribution alliances can strengthen bargaining
powers over exhibitor channels to secure better timing and screens. This thread of studies contributes
to the understandings of organizational learning and impermanence [49], the dynamics of creative
organizations [50], and organizational forms [51].
In the movie industry, all movies and all production companies naturally form a bipartite
graph. On the one side, any given movie is produced by one or multiple production companies.
On the other side, a production company has one or more movies it has produced. If we collect
and combine all historical production information, then we can obtain a complex network of all
movies and production companies. For production companies, any two companies are indirectly
connected by one or multiple coproduced movie projects. Based on this bipartite graph, we can extract
a production company alliance network in which all coproduction relationships are embedded
in this network. Thus, any two production companies are connected by a weighted edge if they
have coproduced certain movies. The weight indicates the number of movies in which they
have been involved. Similarly, we can construct a distribution company alliance network out of
all co-distribution information.
Compared to other industries, the movie industry is ideal to study project alliances from a
network perspective with several advantages. First, the boundaries of movie projects in terms of
clear lifespan and homogeneous participants are well defined [14]. Alliances in other industries often
involve more complicated partnerships along long value chains or supply chains. Second, the mission
of a movie project is well focused, and its stages are distinguishable. The financial performance of
box office revenue can provide direct measurement for movie projects. However, alliances in other
industries are usually multifaceted with tangled structures. Finally, the movie industry possesses
unique advantages in openness and data availability, allowing large-scale quantitative analysis and
alliance network modelings.
3. Hypothesis
In this study, we investigated the following research questions about the performances of movie
alliance networks. First, the degree indicates the capabilities of resource pooling in capital and talents,
knowledge pooling, as well as reputation built through historical cooperations. Usually, a larger
degree is a symbol of great rallying influence in an alliance network. Accordingly, we suggest the
first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Project alliances in which participants have greater degrees in the alliance network positively
increase the performance of project alliances.
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For centralities, we consider eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality in this study.
Eigenvector centrality is a local property to describe the overall influence of alliance companies for a
given focal company. A higher level of eigenvector centrality indicates that the company is connected
to influential companies, but it is itself not necessarily important. In such a case, the company is in a
disadvantaged position in which its alliance partners might benefit more from cooperations. This leads
to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Project alliances in which participants have higher levels of eigenvector centrality do not
positively increase the performance of project alliances.
Unlike eigenvector centrality, which is a local property, betweenness centrality is a global property
to describe the global importance of a company. By definition, betweenness centrality counts the role
of a company in the information traffic moving between pairs of companies in the alliance network.
However, the betweenness approach requires that paths are the shortest. In an alliance network,
for a company, betweenness centrality is largely determined by other, shorter paths for the rest of
the alliance network, which is beyond a specific project alliance. Considering this, we tested the
third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Betweenness centralities of participants have no significant influence on the performance of
project alliances.
The structural hole for a given company measures the positional advantages in the alliance
network. A company with a structural hole is considered to play as bridges for the less connected
parties and thus enjoys complementary information and knowledge of different parts of the networks.
In other words, a given company is essential for the alliance network and has better source pooling
capability. To test this, we propose the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Project alliances in which participants have higher levels of structural holes positively increase
the performance of project alliances.
Lastly, for movie alliances of both production and distribution, it is interesting to investigate
whether these alliance properties from both alliance networks have the same impact on alliance
performance. Therefore, we ask the following research question:
Research Question 1. Which movie alliance network has an effect on the box office, the production alliance or
distribution alliance?
4. Data And Statistics
4.1. Data
To conduct an empirical study, we collected our data using several professional movie
sources, including MTime.com, a leading professional online movie database and service provider,
Boxofficemojo.com, a box office reporting service, and the famous Internet Movie Database
(IMDB.com), the most comprehensive online movie database. First, we collected information for
125,627 movies and 86,503 companies from MTime.com. For each movie, we collected all kinds of movie
profile information, including genre, budget, cast, awards, nominations, release date, and sequels.
To simplify the data, we used the sum of awards and nominations as the award performance. For each
company, we also collected a list of all movies it produced and a list of all movies it distributed.
It might be a production company or a distribution company. However, it is common for a company
to act in both two roles at the same time. In this case, a company is considered both on the production
company alliance network and the distribution company alliance network, respectively. Among all
Entropy 2019, 21, 859 6 of 15
86,503 companies, there were 71,156 production companies that had produced at least one movie and
24,385 distribution companies that had distributed at least one movie. At the intersection, there were
9038 companies that had both the role of production and distribution. We used all this information to
generate a production alliance network NP and a distribution alliance network ND. In the production
alliance network, there were 71,156 production companies and 243,687 coproduction relationships in
the same movie projects that were extracted. In the distribution alliance network, there were 24,385
distribution companies and 586,541 co-distribution relationships in the same movie projects that
were extracted.
Since movies span over several decades and much information is missing, we further narrowed
the movie set by only considering movies released after 2000. By requiring MTime budget information,
global box office data on Boxofficemojo, and IMDB review scores, we finally obtained a subset
consisting of 1433 movies for further study.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for a movie mi, we denoted its production company alliance as Pi
and distribution company alliance Di, respectively. Production company pk ∈ Pi, if pk is one of
the production companies of movie mi. Similarly, distribution company dk ∈ Di, if dk is one of the
production companies of movie mi. Obviously, Pi is part of the production alliance network NP,
i.e., Pi ⊂ NP. Similarly, we also have Di ⊂ ND.








Figure 1. Production company alliance and distribution company alliance for movie mi. For this case,
in production company network NP, four production companies pi, pj, pk, and pl form a production
company alliance for mi, while in distribution company network ND, three distribution companies di,
dj, and dk form the distribution company alliance for mi.
We further calculated the topological properties of production company alliance Pi and
distribution company alliance Di for movie mi on production alliance network NP and distribution
alliance network ND, respectively. In our study, the properties of degree, centrality, and structural
holes were calculated.
4.2. Statistics
Table 1 provides a summary of basic data descriptive statistics. As it shows, we initially collected
125,627 movies, 71,156 production companies, and 24,385 distribution companies. The numbers of
alliances in the whole production network and the distribution network were 243,687 and 586,541,
respectively. On average, for each production company and distribution company, there were three
and 24 alliances, respectively. We saw that both networks were massive and significantly larger than
the networks considered in previous studies. After filtering, a set of 903 movies was finally used as
sample movies for the regression models.
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Table 1. Data description. The total dataset was used to construct alliance networks, while the sample
dataset was used for regression analyses.
Total Sample
Movies 125,627 903
Production companies 71,156 2430
Distribution companies 24,385 2536
Intersection of companies 9038 319
Union of companies 86,503 4647
5. Variables And Model
5.1. Box Office
Total revenue for a movie includes box office sales and sales generated through a variety of
channels like TV, DVDs, and online websites. For theatrical movies, the box office remains the most
important indicator for the success of a movie. Most studies of the movie economy adopt the box office
to evaluate the financial performance of a movie [15,16,21,23,29,51]. Considering that we focus on
the impact of the production and distribution stages, in the same approach of this line of the existing
literature, we used the log of box office revenue BO as our dependent variable. All box offices were
converted into U.S. dollars.
5.2. Movie and Network Variables
We considered two variables. First, in line with many studies on movie performance [52],
the movie profile variables included in this study are the movie making budget, the release year,
the sequel, and the number of awards. Second, to focus our research on network-related hypotheses,
we included network variables of both production and distribution company networks, such as
degrees, degree centralities, eigenvalue centralities, betweenness centralities, and structural holes.
5.2.1. Budget
Currently, a movie is an investment-heavy project. The budget of a movie indicating resource
availability is a key factor for a movie’s financial success [53]. A big budget movie project can be a
good sign of a high quality movie, but might also lead to market failure. Some production companies
proactively outline the budget information of a movie as part of the promotion strategy to attract
media and public attention. However, it is also common in the movie industry that budget information
is not accurately announced for public. For the latter case, estimated budget information provided in
movie databases was used [18]. For budget variable Budget, we used the log value.
5.2.2. Sequels
A sequel of a previously successful movie does not guarantee success. However, studies found
that sequels perform better than movies on average, with relatively fewer risks [13]. Investigations
on cofinancing alliances also found that sequels are less likely to be cofinanced by studios [14].
Since sequels are less risky, they prefer to cofinance movie projects with higher risks [14]. In our sample
dataset of 903 movies, there were 142 identified sequels, checked using IMDB information. In our
analysis, dummy variable Sequel was introduced and set as one for a sequel movie, otherwise zero.
5.2.3. Awards
The number of award wins from professional societies is an indicator of movie quality, but also
a measurement of the human capital for the creative team [6,26]. Usually, wins of leading awards
indicate the high quality of a movie. In our analysis, we used the Awards variable as the number of
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wins. In this study, the Academy Award and other major prestigious awards were included. In total,
1360 wins were identified in 286 movies from 903 sample movies.
5.2.4. Degree
In an alliance network, a company establishes one or multiple alliances with directly-connected
partners. The degree of a company, denoted as k, thus equals its number of alliances. For a company,
a higher degree indicates higher social capital and larger importance in the alliance network.
For a movie mi, we can calculate the total degrees of all production companies and all distribution
companies. For simplicity, we denoted them as PDegree for production alliances and DDegree for
distribution alliances, respectively.
5.2.5. Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality indicates how a company is connected to other companies with high
eigenvector centralities. Technically, the value for a given company is the sum of all connected partners
in its alliances. For a movie mi, we can calculate the total eigenvector centralities of all production
companies and all distribution companies and denote them as PECent and DECent, respectively.
5.2.6. Betweenness Centrality
From another perspective, we calculated betweenness centralities for all production companies
and distribution companies. By definition, betweenness centrality describes the global influence of
a given node in a network. We denote the two centralities as PBCent and DBCent for production
companies and distribution companies, respectively.
5.2.7. Structural Hole
A structural hole indicates how a company is embedded in an alliance network [54]. A company
with a higher structural hole value usually holds an important position and enjoys complementary
information [55]. Similarly, we calculated the values of structural holes and denote the two centralities
as PSH and DSH for production companies and distribution companies, respectively.
5.3. Model
In econometrics, linear regression models are widely used to study the impact of independent
variables on the dependent variables of interest. Linear regression models are simple and sufficient
to quantify the impact in terms of statistical significance and direction. Meanwhile, to be in line
with previous empirical studies on the box office that also use linear-regression models, we also
modeled our study in a linear regression model. To investigate the influence of the properties of both
production and distribution alliance networks on the box office, we used the following regression
model to test the aforementioned hypotheses and research question:
log(BO) = α+ β1 log(Budget) + β2Sequel + β3 Award + β4PDegree + β5CDegree + β6PECent+
β7DECent + β8PBCent + β9DBCent + β10PSH + β11DSH + e.
6. Results And Discussion
In the following, we report the empirical results of the regression model based on the
previously-mentioned variables. All network properties were obtained using the NetworkX Python
package. Regression analysis was carried out using SPSS with the Linear Regression Module.
Table 2 provides a descriptive statistics of all variables. In this table, it is worth mentioning that
the maximum and means of PDegree and DDegree were large with dramatically standard deviations.
By looking into the two alliance networks, we found that those movies had large companies as their
production companies and distribution companies. These companies are involved in a large number of
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movie projects in a long history of bringing huge existing alliances, therefore resulting in large alliance
degrees. The correlations of all independent variables in the regression model are presented in Table 3.
As shown, most correlations were statistically significant at levels of p < 0.01 with only a few not
significant. We found that Budget, Sequel, and Award were positively correlated with the box office,
which agrees with the findings reported in previous studies [15,16,20,36]. The correlations among
independent variables indicate certain inter-influences. This leaves potential rooms for dimension
reductions. Considering that the objective of this study is to understand how the independent variables
contribute to the box office and no variables are excluded for collinearities, so we were able to include
all the variables at the same time.
Regression results are presented in Table 4. All results passed statistical tests. The results
showed that, except for DDegree, DBCent, and PSH, which were not statistically significant at the
level of p < 0.1, the other variables were statistically significant at different levels. Among movie
profile variables, Budget and Sequel were significant at the level of p < 0.01, while Award was
significant, but at a relatively lower level of p < 0.1. The coefficients were all positive. This agrees
with previous studies that movies with larger budgets and sequels are more likely to be successful.
However, achievements in art with more award wins slightly contributed to the box office for
variables of alliance networks. First, we found that PDegree was positive with a significant level
of p < 0.01, indicating that movies produced by production companies with greater degrees in
production alliance networks are likely to do well at the box office. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
However, DDegree was not significant, so for the case of movie alliances, only PDegree was significant.
In other words, degrees of production companies in a production alliance network are important
for the box office. Second, PECent was found to be negative at the significant level of p < 0.01,
while DECentwas also negative at a level of p < 0.1. The results support Hypothesis 2, which means
alliances with higher levels of eigenvector centrality in an alliance network do not positively contribute
to the performance of the alliances. For variables of betweenness, results showed that PBCent had a
rather small coefficient at a slightly significant level: p = 0.074. Moreover, DBCent was not statistically
significant. Hence, Hypothesis 3 was supported, that is, that betweenness centralities in alliance
networks do not significantly contribute to the performance of the alliances. For the variable of
structural holes, we found that PSH was not significant, while DSH was positively correlated at the
level of p < 0.01 being statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was supported that is that
higher levels of structural holes positively increase the performance of the project alliances. For the
case of a movie, structural holes in a distribution company network positively contribute to the box
office. However, the influence of structural holes in a production company alliance network was
not significant.
Finally, we investigated Research Question 1 by comparing the alliance network variables of
a production alliance and distribution alliance. We found that a production alliance network had
two variables, PDegree and PECent, at a significant level of p < 0.01 with larger coefficients, while a
distribution alliance network had only one variable, DSH, at the same level with a smaller coefficient.
In total, production alliance had three significant variables compared to two significant variables for
distribution alliance. We might answer Research Question 1, that both alliance networks had influences
on the box office. However, a production company alliance network had relatively more influence
than the distribution alliance network.
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Table 2. Descriptive variable statistics.
Variables Description Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
BO Box office log 2.640 8.710 6.705 0.854
Budget Budget log 5.110 9.300 7.518 0.632
Sequel Sequel dummy 0.000 1.000 0.157 0.364
Award Number of award wins 0.000 33.000 1.506 3.672
PDegree Total degrees in production network 1.000 12,500.000 846.461 1283.151
DDegree Total degrees in distribution network 2.000 44,426.000 14,875.970 10,067.480
PECent Total eigenvalue centralities in production network 0.000 2.150 0.056 0.225
DECent Total eigenvalue centralities in distribution network 0.000 3.459 0.723 0.741
PBCent Total betweenness centralities in production network 0.000 0.095 0.009 0.012
DBCent Total betweenness centralities in distribution network 0.000 0.093 0.026 0.018
PSH Total structural holes in production network 0.013 3.704 0.651 0.497
DSH Total structural holes in distribution network 0.007 2.665 0.481 0.323
Table 3. Correlation coefficients.
Variables BO Budget Sequel Award PDegree DDegree PECent DECent PBCent DBCent PSH DSH
BO 1
Budget 0.517 *** 1
Sequel 0.3 *** 0.308 *** 1
Award 0.113 *** 0.09 *** −0.002 1
PDegree −0.014 0.067 ** −0.016 0.013 1
DDegree 0.282 *** 0.609 *** 0.199 *** 0.204 *** 0.129 *** 1
PECent −0.132 *** −0.025 −0.043 * −0.045 * 0.925 *** 0.057 ** 1
DECent 0.295 *** 0.595 *** 0.236 *** 0.144 *** 0.07 ** 0.74 *** −0.038 1
PBCent 0.066 ** 0.159 *** 0.031 0.073 ** 0.909 *** 0.201 *** 0.75 *** 0.202 *** 1
DBCent 0.187 *** 0.429 *** 0.114 *** 0.175 *** 0.15 *** 0.884 *** 0.08 *** 0.639 *** 0.199 *** 1
PSH −0.09 *** −0.219 *** −0.054 * −0.045 * −0.026 −0.199 *** 0.001 −0.192 *** −0.092 *** −0.139 *** 1
DSH 0.3 *** 0.381 *** 0.215 *** 0.135 *** −0.08 *** 0.332 *** −0.126 *** 0.439 *** 0.004 0.179 *** 0.017 1
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4. Box office regression results.
Variables Coeff. Std. Err.
Budget 0.462 *** 0.052
Sequel 0.152 *** 0.067
Award 0.050 * 0.007
PDegree 0.684 *** 0.000
DDegree −0.067 0.000
PECent −0.622 *** 0.335
DECent −0.087 * 0.052
PBCent −0.147 * 6.046
DBCent 0.033 3.029
PSH −0.001 0.049
DSH 0.116 *** 0.085
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
7. Conclusions
Alliances are important networks of cooperations formed by relevant stakeholders. Specifically,
project alliances are unique, with limited lifespans, clearly-defined boundaries, multiple stages,
and project-oriented missions. Thanks to the public availability of movie project data, the movie
industry provides unique opportunities to investigate project alliances. A movie project can be divided
into production and distribution stages. Production companies co-finance and organize the making of a
movie project before the finished movie is released through market channels by distribution companies.
The financial performance of a movie project can be measured by its box office. For a successful movie,
all stakeholders involved in the movie project alliance can enjoy the revenue. The box office was found
to rely on several determinants of the movie itself [18]. From the perspective of social network theory,
studies explored the influence of social network effects at the individual level [26] or production
network [46]. The distribution strategy has been explored, but distribution company networks have
been less studied [48,56,57].
To investigate the influence of production and distribution alliance networks on the box office,
in this work, we used a subset including 903 movies, 2430 production companies, and 2536 distribution
companies from the whole dataset. Production company networks and distribution company networks
are constructed based on collaborations in the same movie projects. In our final dataset, 903 movies
satisfying the data criteria were selected for analysis covering major studios and types up until 2017.
Network properties such as degrees, centralities, and structural holes of both alliance networks were
calculated for each movie. Taking the box office as the dependent variable and network properties
together with movie basic information as independent variables, we built regression models to see
how alliance networks influence the box office.
Our results showed that the financial performance of movie alliance projects was significantly
influenced by the alliance network properties. Degrees of production companies in a production
alliance network were found to positively contribute to the box office, while the degrees of distribution
companies in the distribution alliance network had no significant influence on the box office.
The eigenvector centralities of both the production and distribution alliance networks did not positively
contribute to the box office. However, the betweenness centralities of the two networks did not
significantly contribute to the box office. The structural holes of a distribution alliance network
significantly and positively contributed to the box office, while the structural holes of a production
alliance network did not. From the empirical results, we found that the network properties of two
alliance networks had different contributions to the box office. In general, a production alliance
network had more influence on the box office than a distribution alliance network.
By using a massive dataset of movie project alliance networks, this study empirically investigated
the influence of alliance network topological properties on the performance of project alliances.
This work contributes to the literature on box office and alliance networks by considering
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company-level alliance networks of both production and distribution alliances. The results shed
light on how alliance network properties contribute to the financial performance of project alliances.
For the case of movies, the two networks contributed to the box office differently. This work adds new
evidence to existing studies that mainly focused on individual level cooperation networks or just one
of the two alliance networks.
A quantitative understanding of the determinants of financial performance and the influence
of both alliance networks is important for movie professionals. Our results have several practical
implications for movie industry professionals to achieve better financial performance, i.e., in the box
office. First, as usual, a larger budget, better performance in art, i.e., winning awards, and making
sequels were more likely to achieve a better box office. Second, choosing alliance networks did matter
for the performance of movie project alliances. More specifically, production degrees were important
for the box office, but distribution degrees were not. In other words, it is wise to choose production
companies with larger degrees in the movie making stage. More resources can be pooled to ensure
final box office success. Choosing distribution companies solely with large degrees in distribution
company alliance networks had no significant contribution to the box office. Since different companies
have various centralities, the present results suggest that it is better to avoid companies with larger
eigenvector centralities. Both production and distribution companies did not especially positively
contribute to the box office. Larger eigenvector centrality only implied the company had alliances
with other companies with even larger centralities. Disadvantaged positions among cooperations
hampered the relative bargaining power of the company, offset benefits, and eventually led to negative
performance. Unlike the local properties of degrees and eigenvector centralities, global betweenness
centralities did not significantly influence the final box office. Therefore, practitioners should focus
on local alliances. The results also revealed that the structural holes of distribution company alliance
networks instead of production company alliance networks had a significant influence on the box
office. This implies that distribution companies with greater structural holes that connect different
distribution channels were crucial for the box office.
However, the present work has some limitations that need attention and future exploration.
First, the movies considered were only those released after 1964. If we considered a wider period,
more movie alliances in different periods could be investigated. It would also be interesting to see how
the topological properties and patterns of movie alliances evolve. Second, like the existing literature
on the box office that focuses on either individual- or company-level networks, this work studied
production- and distribution firm-level alliances. It would be worth trying to consider both levels of
alliance networks together to see how the two networks influence each other and how they influence
the final box office. Lastly, further work is worthwhile to investigate the topologies of both alliance
networks to see how local and global structures behind the properties discussed in the present work
influence performance. Meanwhile, in the present work, we included and focused on the independent
variables of both production and distribution alliance networks, as well as the topological properties
covering degree, eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, and structural holes to reflect different
aspects of the networks. However, it is worth further investigating other possible models for different
combinations of independent variables. Possible dimension reduction approaches could be applied to
further simplify the model.
In conclusion, we provided new evidence on the financial performance of production and
distribution movie project alliances. With this work, we hope to inspire and stimulate future studies
on the performance of alliance networks, as well as the economics of the motion picture industry.
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